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I. Introduction
Hardships imposed by race and poverty have severely limited owner-
ship of productive resources by members of minority groups.' Minori-
ties control less than 3% of businesses in the United States, although
they constitute 15% of the population; and they own only 25% of
businesses located in ghettoes, although they comprise a substantial
proportion of the ghetto population.2 Receipts of minority-owned busi-
nesses amount to less than 1% of total U.S. business receipts.3 This
stark imbalance in ownership has spawned a broad range of programs
aimed at promoting "minority economic development." Three main
approaches have been taken. First, major corporations have established
subsidiaries ("spin-offs") in urban ghettoes, with ownership immedi-
ately or eventually devolving to minority entrepreneurs or community
groups.4 A second approach has been to build Community Develop-
ment Corporations (CDC's) in the ghettoes. The CDC is a community
based corporation which sells shares in its own businesses to community
residents or finances businesses controlled by individuals in the com-
munity.5 The third approach has been to form free-standing businesses
owned by minority entrepreneurs. Such enterprises have no special
relationship to parent corporations or to ghetto community organiza.
tions.
Commercial banks have proved to be the major private sector institu-
o Research for this piece was made possible by financial support from the Ford
Foundation. Special thanks for critical help are owed to Ford Foundation Vice-President
Mitchell Sviridoff, and to Program Officer Eamon Kelly. The views expressed here, how-
ever, are not assignable to either of them or to the Ford Foundation.
1. Throughout this study, the term "minority" is used to refer to non-white racial
minorities.
2. S. LEviTAN, G. MANGUM & R. TAGGART III, ECONOMIC OPORTUNrrY IN TulE Gimo:
THE PARTNERsHip OF GOVERNMENT Am BUSINESS 5 (1970); A. Jennings, S. Synnott &
E. Graham, A Note on Black Capitalism 9-10 (Harvard Business School Note EA-R555,
1969); H. Samuels, Compensatory Capitalism in BLAcK ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 60, 62-63
(W. Haddad & G. Pugh ed. 1969).
3. A. Jennings, S. Synnott & E. Graham, note 1 supra, at 9-10.
4. Examples are plants started by IBM in Bedford-Stuyvesant, New York City, by
AVCO in Roxbury, Boston, by Fairchild-Hiller in Baltimore, and by Acro.Jet General In
Watts, Los Angeles.
5. Some CDC's have been financed under Title I-D of the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2763-68 (Supp. V, 1970), for example, the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restora-
tion Corporation (New York), The Hough Development Corporation (Cleveland), and
the North Lawndale Economic Development Corporation (Chicago).
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don aiding the establishment of such free-standing minority-owned
businesses. 6 These banks have also financed changes in ownership from
white to minority businessmen and have supported expansion of ex-
isting minority-owned businesses. The purpose of this Note is to
explore the extent and complexion of the special efforts of commercial
banks to finance free-standing minority-owned small businesses7
The Note does not attempt to analyze fully the concept of minority
economic development; nor, correlatively, will it attempt to evaluate
the creation of free-standing businesses as one of several strategies for
achieving economic development of the ghetto or economic equality
of the races. The focus will be simply on the nature and, where possi-
ble, the effectiveness of the relationship between commercial banks,
acting primarily as lenders, and individual minority entrepreneurs.
Because special programs aimed at individual entrepreneurs are not
limited to the development of businesses within the ghetto or barrio-
businesses which characteristically face markets with low-income buyers
and high cost-free-standing businesses probably stand a greater chance
of surviving. However, to the extent that new free-standing businesses
are located outside the ghetto and are controlled wholly by individual
entrepreneurs, they do not offer the collateral economic, political and
social benefits to an impoverished minority community which broader
community economic development could provide.
A. The Process of Creating Businesses: Problems Facing Minority
Entrepreneurs
Prospective minority entrepreneurs face problems at four major
stages in the process of creating free-standing businesses. During the
first stage-loosely called "packaging"-the borrower prepares to deal
with the credit market. He must undertake elementary feasibility
studies, draw up cash-flow and balance sheet projections, and prepare
the other documents normally required for a business loan.8
6. Of course commercial banks do not exhaust the range of financial institutions. But
Small Business Investment Companies' involvement, to the extent there is any, is with
equity financing. See note 47 infra. Insurance companies' efforts have been devoted mainly
to financing low-income housing. And investment banks have thus far undertaken no
major efforts toward aiding minority economic development.
7. The Small Business Administration (SBA) definition is taken when minority.ov.ned
businesses are referred to as "small businesses." This actually encompasses a broad range,
from owner-no employee "Mom and Pop" stores to manufacturing concerns with 250
employees or, in some cases, more. Warehousing operations are "small" if annual receipts
do not exceed $1 million. 13 C.F.L § 121.3-10 (1970). When the text compares smaler
or larger minority-owned businesses, the comparison takes place within the ample range
of enterprises denominated "small" by the SBA.
8. Although packaging services are scarce, several organizations have been created to
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Second, the prospective businessman must procure "equity financ-
ing." The term "equity financing," in its strictest sense, refers to
business financing based on the sale of an ownership interest. As used by
those involved in financing minority-owned businesses, however, the
term encompasses the sale of long-term subordinated debt obligations
as well.9 The ingredient common to both forms of equity financing,
from the point of view of the entrepreneur, is the freedom from re-
payment obligations during early years of the business's operation.
The borrower then faces the third problem, that of acquiring debt
financing. Efforts at this stage depend in part on success at the second,
since the amount of money which small businessmen are able to borrow
from banks depends on the size of the equity base in the business;
traditionally, small businessmen have been able to borrow amounts no
perform these services. Typically funded by the federal government, corporations and
foundations, examples of packaging institutions are the Rochester Business Opportunitics
Corporation, the Chicago Economic Development Corporation, Capital Formation (New
York City), and the Coalition Venture Corporation (New York City).
This Note is concerned with commercial banks and their ability to finance high-risk
minority entrepreneurs. Packaging agencies contribute to such bank efforts in two ways:
to the extent which packaging and post-loan assistance are available and enhance the
likelihood of a minority business' success, these services should reduce delinquencies and
failures for the banks; second, packagers save banks money by performing much laborlou,
pre-loan review.
There are at least two conceptual problems, however, with packagin agencies. One b,
that packagers insulate banks from an important phase in the processing of a high-risk
minority loan, and thereby forestall institutionalization of minority lending. The second
propblem is that packagers create an incentive for banks to refer all "unbankable"
minority loan applicants outside for initial screening, and by so doing Introduce in
artificial onopolistic structure into minority loan applicants' access to credit mar.
kets. The ice of one high quality but understaffed packager in a city, and rarely arc
there more, creates a potentially troublesome bottleneck through which minority bor.
rowers must slowly pass if they are to receive credit.
The first problem, at least currently, is moot. Most banks are in no position to under.
take the functions performed by packagers. Even banks which have special programs and
which do a substantial amount of dealing directly with borrowers find in some cases that
packagers have a comparative advantage in dealing with borrowers in the most rudi-
mentary stages.
The second objection is more serious. It may already be in some cities that access to
credit is restricted monopolisticaly by the scarcity of packagers and banks' reliance upon
them. To the extent that bank own programs are capable of dealing with borrowers from
the start, this bottleneck is eased. That the banks interviewed had an average of onl
34.5% of their loans made in conjunction with such "auxiliary institutions" (See Table 2
infra) may suggest that the banks most actively devoted to developing minority businesses
possess some sort of "packaging" capability.
But because existing packagers invariably have substantial backlogs of applications, It
is fair to assume that such bottlenecks do exist. Interviews vith the following: Roland
Burris, Continental Illinois National Bank, in Chicago, July 9, 1970; David L. Keller,
American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, in Chicago, July 10, 1970,
Garland C. Guice, Chicago Economic Development Corporation, in Chicago, July 13, 1970
[hereinafter cited as Guice, CEDC Interview]; William Zucker, job Loan Corporation, in
Philadelphia, July 6, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Zucker, JLC Interview]; Ed Lucero.
Colorado Economic Development Association, in Denver, July 22, 1970 [hereinafter cited
as Lucero, CEDA Interview].
9. Interview with Miss A.V. Krieg, Marine Midland Bank, in Rochester, N.Y., June 29,
1970.
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greater than their business's equity, or net worth. Debt financing has
performed a number of important functions for businesses, from
financing construction (long term mortgages) to financing seasonal
inventory needs or accounts receivable (very short term loans). In the
minority enterprise context, however, the lack of available equity
within the borrower's personal reach and the lack of outside equity
sources have driven borrowers and debt financers to rely almost exclu-
sively on debt financing for all the financing needs of the business.
The final problem for the prospective minority entrepreneur is ob-
taining post-loan assistance.10 If the businessman has merely borrowed
for expansion, he may need no post-loan help, but if he is managing a
business for the first time, he may need help in setting up bookkeeping
systems, planning inventory levels, or laying out marketing strategies.
A minority-owned business's search for debt financing-the phase
of business creation upon which this Note will focus-almost always
requires the assistance of commercial banks. As a result, in recent years
there have been calls for expanded lending to aid minority entrepre-
neurs.
B. Evaluating Commercial Bank Performance
To stimulate debt financing for prospective minority entrepreneurs
who could not otherwise have obtained it, both the American Bankers
Association (ABA) and the Small Business Administration (SBA) an-
nounced long term minority lending goals in 1968. The ABA simply
appealed to banks to undertake one billion dollars of "high-risk" lend-
ing to minority borrowers by 1975.11 The SBA's appeal for more
minority enterprises, on the other hand, was formalized in Project
OWN, a program launched soon after Howard Samuels was appointed
administrator of the SBA in the summer of 1968. An ex-businessman
10. Packaging and post-loan assistance are not necessarily available from the same
source. In fact, all bankers interviewed agreed that the critical ingredient of post-loan
assistance is virtually unavailable.
Most banks require monthly or quarterly statements from borrowers, but rarely are they
received from recipients of minority enterprise loans, and even more rarely are they
studied. No banker interviewed thought his banks monitoring procedures were sensitive
enough to forewarn of impending trouble. Banks have tended to place responsibility for
follow-up on their lending officers, and these officers are usually too busy with new loans
to do more than make an occasional telephone call or Visit to the new entrepreneur.
Packaging agencies admit that they are also weak on following-up loans. Thoe agencies
are under relatively close periodic scrutiny from their funding sources, and yield to the
imperative of manifesting high performance. The result is a commitment of resources to
pre-loan work to the relative exclusion of less visible post-loan assistance. Guice, CEDC
Interview; Zucker, JLC Interview.
11. Interview with Peter F. McNeish, Executive Secretary, Committee on Urban Affairs,
American Bankers Association, in Washington, D.C., June 2,0 1970.
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who believed that private development was crucial to solving urban
and racial problems, Samuels hoped to use loan guarantees to stimulate
a major increase in debt financing of high-risk minority businesses by
commercial banks. His twenty year goal was to bring the proportion
of businesses owned by minorities into line with the proportion of
minorities in the population.12 Project OWN aimed at financing 10,000
businesses in the first year, a number increasing to 20,000 businesses
per year thereafter, and finally reaching a 40,000 annual rate in the late
1970's.18
This Note will attempt to assess how commercial banks have re-
sponded to calls for increased lending to minority entrepreneurs. Bank
performance could, at least in theory, be measured against the goals
announced by Project OWN or the ABA. Performance could also be
measured against demand for minority loans on any given set of re-
payment terms or against some other standard of "need" based, for ex-
ample, on a "desirable" scale of business or on their "degrees" of "labor
intensity." But neither Samuels nor anyone else has really justified the
choice of any particular goal for bank lending. Such a justification
would necessarily entail a sophisticated analysis of the need for and the
various approaches to minority economic development. In addition,
there are serious methodological difficulties with using any of the sug-
gested goals. The Project OWN and ABA goals are too crude to be used
as guides to increased understanding of the debt financing process. The
demand standard is so complex as to be impossible to ascertain with
present information; it also would be so crude as to hide important
aspects of enterprise creation.
Consequently, this Note takes the more modest approach of assuming
that some "large," if unspecified, increase in the level of lending is a
desirable goal if minority entrepreneurship is to increase. Thus it does
not attempt to decide whether a "sufficient" volume of loans is being
made or to analyze what constitutes "sufficiency." However, in order to
achieve any substantial increase in lending, progress towards certain
interrelated sub-goals of minority lending is necessary. To facilitate
description of bank performance, therefore, this Note identifies five
sub-goals which together can be used to describe or measure the nature
12. S. Levitan & R. Taggart, III, Developing Business in the Ghetto, in I ECONoMUC
DEVELOPNMENT PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 241, 247 (W. Farr, Jr. ed.), (New York University
Law School, 1968) [hereinafter cited as I Far].
15. New York Times, Aug. 14, 1968, at 16, col. 1; H. Samuels, Development of Minority
Business Ownership . . I Executive Summary (undated mimeo), at 12.
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and volume of the loan flow.' 4 For there to be an increase in the crea-
tion of free-standing minority businesses, this Note assumes that:
1. There should be an increased flow of loans to high-risk minority
businessmen.15
2. The loans should be directed to those businesses most likely to
survive. While it is difficult to measure performance as to this
sub-goal directly, certain inferences can be drawn from the char-
acteristic failure rates of types and sizes of businesses receiving
loans.',
3. Bankers must be willing to forego traditional credit prerequisites,
such as equity financing, management experience and collateral.
Without such flexibility, banks will by definition fail to increase
lending to minority borrowers who could not othervise have
obtained credit.
4. Banks must be willing to mitigate the shortage of equity financing
by structuring loan terms to overcome the potentially crippling
debt service costs of businesses financed largely by debt.'7
5. Minority lending must be institutionalized by banks in a way that
maximizes outreach to potential borrowers, minimizes stigma,
14. No supply side analysis can accurately describe reality without accounting for de-
mand. Throughout this piece, judgments are made which assume an unsatisfied demand
by potential minority entrepreneurs for credit. One can have no a priori grasp of the
amount of this unsatisfied demand. Based upon interviews and the accomplishments of
certain banks, however, the following assumptions are made:
a. There exists a large potential demand in black communities for business loans.
b. Much of this demand is not cognizable by credit markets operating in traditional
ways. Several consequences ensue:
(1) the role of packaging and post-loan assistance as ways to expand the ability of the
potential minority entrepreneur to utilize credit profitably is enhanced;
(2) to make loans to high-risk minority borrowers, banks must be willing to forego
traditional, and arguably rational, credit prerequisites;
(3) banks which do not undertake special efforts of their own and/or do not establish
relationships with packagers and other referral sources are unlikely to make loans
to high-risk minority borrowers.
c. Business loans to new high-risk minority borrowers need not be in support of
small, marginal businesses, although the ability to loan money to more sizeable and
promising ventures requires more planning on the part of the bank.
15. Use of an increased flow of loans as a criterion of performance, as noted above, is
somewhat troublesome, since there is no way of knowing when "enough" credit Is avail-
able. At this stage in the history of the minority entrepreneurship effort, however, there
are still queues at the minority lending windows of commerial banks with special pro-
grams. Further, at many banks and in many cities, such lending windows do not yet exist.
For these reasons, a performance criterion predicated simply on an unspecified increase in
the flow of credit largely avoids the risk of insisting on an over-supply of credit.
16. See the findings of the American Bankers Association and Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation studies, discussed in note 40 infra.
17. For a discussion of recent efforts to expand the availability of equity finandng for
minority entrepreneurs, see note 47 infra.
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and maximizes lending officer incentives to make loans to minority
borrowers.'
8
It is important to recognize at the outset that the loans made by a
bank in accordance with the sub-goals would be "soft," absent govern-
ment subsidy. A loan is "hard" only when the expected present value
of the repayment stream, discounted by the yield of loan resources in
other uses, is equal to or greater than the amount of the loan. Prime
borrowers receive low rates because risk is unusually small and balances
maintained on deposit are unusually large, thereby boosting the effec-
tive value of payments, allowing lower interest rates along with profita-
bility. Administrative costs are also small relative to the revenue gen-
erated.
In the case of minority borrowers, however, the sub-goals describe a
performance standard involving high-risk loans made with long maturi-
ties and repayment structures tailored to the cash flow needs of a new
business financed primarily with debt obligations. Unless interest rates
charged are commensurate with the high risk, the expected present
value of the repayment stream of a high-risk minority loan will be
less than the amount of the loan, and the loan will be "soft," containing,
in effect, a grant component. Longer terms of repayment, forgiveness
of principal repayment, and larger administrative expenses serve to
enlarge that grant component. Because softness also means lesser profit-
ability, it is likely to have marked effects on the flow of loans and the
prospects for institutionalization of minority lending at banks.
C. Methodology
To evaluate bank performance in terms of these five indices an
attempt was made to obtain both national aggregate data where avail-
able and detailed data on those banks which have made intensive efforts
to expand minority lending. On the assumption that most high-risk
18. It may be asked why institutionalization of high-risk lending at banks is a sub-goal
to the broader goal of expanded minority lending. Why should the government itself not
undertake minority lending, leaving subsequent financial needs of successful ventures to
the profit-sensitive private sector?
There are two basic arguments in defense of a joint private sector-public sector ap.
proach. First, any given budgetary amount is likely to be more cost-effective if used for
incentives rather than direct loans. This was the discovery behind Project OWN whidtch
underwrote that program's substantial achievements. Even if one were to abstract away
from the realpolitih of the budgetary process and hypothesize an unlimited ability of the
federal government to raise money and spend it, significant administrative and "tax fric-
tion" costs would be incurred in a direct lending approach. Also, there is no reason to
assume that lower level civil servants would be any more relaxed about risk-taking than
bank lending officers.
The second basic argument is that the "joint venture" approach to minority entre-
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loans are made under the aegis of SBA programs, 10 figures have been
computed from raw, unpublished SBA data to obtain an approxima-
tion of the national picture as to the first two sub-goals of bank per-
formance-the size of the loan flow and (inferentially) the scale and
type of businesses receiving credit.2 0 As to credit prerequisites and
loan terms, SBA requirements provide a limit, but the SBA compiles
no data. Nor does the SBA catalogue special bank programs promoting
minority lending.
The ABA reports that of the three hundred largest commercial
banks in the United States, eighty-nine have established special lending
programs for minority entrepreneurs. 21 In terms of special efforts to
aid minority businesses, then, banks vary substantially. To assess the
performance in terms of the five sub-goals of those banks which have
made the greatest efforts, field interviews were conducted in the sum-
mer of 1970 at fourteen banks in seven cities. These institutions repre-
sent those commercial banks in various geographic regions2 which have
demonstrated the greatest commitment of time, energy, and loan re-
sources to the financing of high-risk minority enterprises.2
preneurship may be producing a significant external benefit in the form of reduced racial
discrimination in credit markets. Even if there is presently "too little" lending being
done by banks, all evidence is that banks which have taken minority entrepreneurship
seriously are at least giving serious consideration to minority group loan applicants.
19. See pp. 622-24 infra.
20. These statistics are unfortunately incomplete, as the categories included have
become progressively more sophisticated and useful from fiscal 1968 to the prsent. Some
temporal comparisons are thus impossible.
21. Urban Affairs Committee, The American Bankers Association, Urban Affairs Survey
9 (undated) [hereinafter cited as ABA Survey].
22. In selecting the cities, an effort was made to include at least one city in the North-
east, the South, the Mid-west, and the Far-West. Choices among cities were made on the
basis of expected productivity of interviewing time.
23. The list of cities and banks was derived with the generous assistance of Peter F.
McNeish, Executive Secretary, Committee on Urban Affairs, American Bankers Associa-
tion, in Washington, D. C., June 22, 1970. The list is not exhaustive--some difficult
choices were governed by the constraints of time and stamina. The banks at which inter-
views were conducted were: Atlanta: Citizens & Southern National Bank, July 14, 1970;
Chicago: American National Bank and Trust Company, July 10, 1970; Continental Illinois
National Bank, July 9, 1970; First National Bank of Chicago, July 9, 1970; Hyde Park
Bank and Trust Co., July 9, 1970; Denver: Colorado National Bank, July 21, 1970; Denver
U.S. National Bank, July 20, 1970; New York City: Chase Manhattan Bank, July 28, 1970
(data includes loans made by that bank's Small Business Investment Company, the Chase
Manhattan Capital Corporation); Philadelphia: Central Penn National Bank, July 7,
1970; First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Company, July 6, 1970; Girard Bank, July 8,
1970; Rochester. Marine Midland Bank, June 29, 1970; San Francisco: (all data are for
banks' state-wide minority lending activities): Bank of America, July 24, 1970; Wells Fargo
Bank, July 24, 1970.
Bank data when given in the text will usually be anonymous, as several banks have
requested. The sampling technique described above is far from rigorous, but proved to be
the most expeditious way of working up a list of "active" banks. Nothing claimed from
the data necessitates true representativeness.
Although quantitative questions were sent ahead, much of the numerical data gathered
is only approximate. Its accuracy is not uniform among the banks.
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In the sections that follow, this Note will present the SBA and field
interview data, suggest implications in terms of the five sub-goals, and
propose steps to accelerate bank participation in minority lending.
II. Aggregate Bank Response
A. Small Business Administration Programs
The two SBA programs of greatest interest to prospective minority
entrepreneurs and to commercial banks interested in financing those
entrepreneurs are the Economic Opportunity Loan (EOL) and the
"7(a)" Business Loan. The purpose of both programs is the encourage-
ment of small business development. Under the programs, the SBA
can loan money directly, participate with private sector institutions in
a joint financing, or guarantee loans made directly by banks.2 4
On both direct loans and the SBA share of participation loans under
EOL, the interest rate is 55% per year. On participation loans, the
private sector participant cannot charge more than 8% on his share
of the joint financing.25 On guaranteed loans, the lending institution
must set a "legal and reasonable" interest rate.20
To qualify for an EOL loan, a borrower must have "been denied
the opportunity to have access to adequate financing on reasonable
terms, through normal lending channels because of economic or social
Because the study is concerned with the extent to which banks are consciously working
to expand loans to high-risk minority entrepreneurs, data was gathered from the banks
interviewed only with respect to business loans made under the auspices of a special
program or efforts, denominated "minority loans" in this study. The data reported here
thus do not represent all the business which banks do with minority borrowers because
they do not include loans made in the ordinary course of business.
In addition, minority-owned banks were excluded from the sample because it would
have been difficult to get accurate information on "special efforts" from banks which
deal mostly with minority borrowers and because the concern of this study is the extent
to which the commercial banking industry has expanded and institutionalized minority
lending programs. Black-owned banks in the U.S., for example, are only twenty In number
with total assets of $162 million, compared with $334 billion in total assets for all banks
in the country. T. CRoss, BLACK CAPiTALSri 50 (1969).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2902 (Supp. V, 1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 636 (Supp. V, 1970), respectively,
The SBA administers other programs as well, including Disaster Loans, Displaced Business
Loans, Local Development Company Loans, and the Small Business Investment Company
program, including Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Companies (MESBIC),
discussed in note 47 infra. Apart from the EOL, 7(a), and MESBIC programs, tie only
other SBA program involved in financing enterprises for minority group entrepreneurs
is the Local Development Company Loan. This device is mainly used by development
companies to make improvements on real estate for subsequent business use, and is thus
outside the focus of this study, which is bank financing of the businesses themselves.
25. 13 C.F.R. §§ 119.31(c)(1), (2) (1970).
26. Id. at (c)(3).
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disadvantage." 27 The EOL program authorizes loans of up to $25,000
for up to 15 years,28 and loans may be guaranteed up to 100%.20
The 7(a) loan program, alternatively called the "regular business"
loan, has no requirement that the borrower be from an economically
disadvantaged group. Important differences between the 7(a) and EOL
programs are that the SBA's guaranteed share of a 7(a) loan can be as
much as $350,000, but that the guarantee can equal no more than
90% of the loan. 0
The base line from which to measure the aggregate bank response
to the call for increased loans to high-risk minority enterprises is fiscal
1968, since Project OWN and the ABA announced their goals early in
fiscal 1969.
Three major changes were implemented under Project OWN. First,
administrative procedures were streamlined, so that SBA approval or
disapproval of a loan application could be rendered within 10 days.31
A blanket guarantee procedure was developed, whereby a bank could
sign an agreement after which a short form could be used for individual
loans.3
2
Second, credit criteria were changed. Loans to effect a change in
ownership of a business, normally prohibited, were allowed for minor-
ity borrowers. The proportion of equity financing required in a borrow-
ing was lowered from 50% of the total financing to 15%, and was made
waivable by the local SBA offices if projections indicated a reasonable
chance of repayment. Inadequate collateral was to be disregarded if it
appeared that a loan could be repaid from future earnings. Principal
27. 13 C.F.R. § 119.21(b) (1970). Another requirement is that the funds should be other-
wise unavailable. 13 C.F.R. § 119.21(f) (1970). Yet there is no mention of how this is to
be proved, save that, "the applicant's bank of account, if any, will be contacted to deter-
mine its willingness to finance the applicant independently, to participate with SBA, or
to make a loan with a guaranty by SBA." Id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2902 (Supp. V, 1970).
29. 13 C.F.R. § 119.41(a) (1970).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4) (Supp. V, 1970), 13 C.F.R. §§ 119.41(a), 120.2(b)(2) (1970). An-
other difference between the 7(a) and EOL loans is that the requirement of proof that
funds are otherwise unavailable is laid out in greater detail for the 7(a) loan. Credit is
deemed to be available absent proof of a refusal from a bank (or two banks, in cities over
200,000 in population). This proof must recite the details of the loan and the reasons for
refusal. 13 C.F.R. § 120.2(a)(1) (1970). The borrower must also show that financial assist-
ance is unobtainable on reasonable terms through a public offering or pri%ate placement
of stock, through the sale at a fair price of assets unessential to the business' operation,
from personal borrowing by the entrepreneur, his partners or shareholders (without
causing them undue hardship), or from other sources of government financing. 13 C.F.R.
§ 120.2(a)(2) (1970), cf. note 27 supra.
31. Testimony of Howard J. Samuels, SBA Administrator, Financial Institutions and
the Urban Crisis, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
32. Id.
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payments on EOL loans could be deferred for 13 months from the date
of the note, and smaller payments could be structured for the early
years of the loan.
83
Third, the SBA field staff were instructed to spend more time work-
ing with minority borrowers in the preparation of their business and
financial plans and loan applications.
84
B. Flow Of Loans and Types of Businesses Borrowing-The Aggre-
gate Profile
Before presenting the SBA data, a last caveat is in order-not all
high-risk minority loans go through the SBA. Although there is ob-
viously a strong incentive for a bank to seek an SBA guarantee on such
a loan, in some cases there are possible counterbalancing factors. One
is an ideological position in some banks that the private sector has an
obligation to make minority loans, and should have nothing to do with
the government. Another is the quality of the local SBA office and of
the bank's relationship with that office-not all SBA offices have liber-
alized equally under Project OWN and its successor, Project Main-
stream. A third is that the SBA insists on loans with fixed amortization
schedules (term loans), whereas a business may require the greater
flexibility of a line of credit to meet its needs.
On the other hand, the SBA data may be more accurate than banks'
claimed totals of minority loans, since those claims may be inflated by
the inclusion of loans which are not genuinely "high-risk," a practice
called "creaming." Such loans might be unable to satisfy the SBA
requirement of proof that the money is not otherwise available.30
The SBA data for fiscal years 1968 through 1970 are reproduced in
Table 1.
Findings. From this data it is clear that projects OWN and Main-
stream accomplished a major increase in the flow of loans to high-risk
minority borrowers. The 1,724 minority loans in the EOL and 7(a)
programs combined, totalling $26.8 million in 1968, increased to 6,104
loans totalling $145.1 million in 1970. Minority businessmen obtained
24.14% of the money loaned by and with the SBA in fiscal 1970 as com-
pared with 5.09% in fiscal 1968. Yet the average size of the minority
loans made through the SBA increased only modestly, and more than
33. SBA Report on Project OWN, Jan. 1969, in I Farr 130, 134-36; 13 C.F.R. §§ 119.21
(c), 119.31(d), 119.31(b) (1970).
34. I Farr 130, 134-36.
35. For a discussion of the extent to which the banks included in the field survey uscd
SBA guarantees, see pp. 631-32 infra.
36. See notes 27 and 30 supra.
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70% of minority loans in 1969 and 1970 were EOL loans (maximum
$25,000).
Projects OWN and Mainstream have thus succeeded in involving
private sector institutions in minority lending. The amount of private
TABLE 137
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37. 1968 SBA Management Report; 1969 SBA Management Report pt. 1; 1970 SBA
Management Report. Most categories of information reported here were not reported
per se by the SBA, but were calculated from data reported. "Private Sector-Related" is the
private sector amount lent in participation loans plus the full amount of guaranteed
loans. Private sector risk exposure is here defined as the amount of private investment in
participation loans plus guaranteed loans net of the share guaranteed by the SBA.
Minority lending data from the SBA are available in varying detail for the three fscal
years under study. These data are presented and analyzed in Table 1. WThere data cate-
gories are not denominated "minority," the data refer to total SBA lending, and provide
information about minority lending patterns only inferentially.
A problem with the SBA data is that the SBA field offices may not be strictly enforcing
the requirement of proof that the money is not otherwise a%ailable, see notes 207 and S0
supra. To the extent this is true, SBA figures may reflect "creaming," or the inclusion of
loans not genuinely "unbankable."
The federal government fiscal year is July 1 to June 30; years .hen referred to through-
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Fiscal 1968 Fiscal 1969 Fiscal 1970
TOTAL 7(a), EOL
1. Total # Loans 12,367 13,723 14,258
2. Total $ Loans $526.8 mill. $595.0 mill. $601.0 mill.
3. Total # 7(a) 9,476 9,494 8,719
4. Total $ 7(a) $495.6 mill. $543.7 mill. $528.3 mill.
5. Total # EOL 2,891 4,229 5,539
6. Total $ EOL $31.2 mill. $51.3 mill. $72.7 mill.
7. Average size $42,597 $43,357 $42,151
8. Average size, 7(a) $52,300 $57,267 $60,590
9. Average size, EOL $10,792 $12,139 $18,125
10. % Which Gtee (#) 32.47% 56.89% 57.89%
11. % 7(a) Which
Gtee (#) 38.79% 65.36% 75.08%
12. % EOL Which
Gtee (#) 11.76% 37.88% 30.81%
13. % Which EOL (#) 23.38% 30.82% $8.85%
14. % Which EOL ($) 5.92% 8.62% 12.10%
15. Rate of Increase (#) 10.96% 3.90%
16. Rate of Increase,
7(a) (#) 0.19% -8.16%
17. Rate of Increase,
EOL (#) 46.28% 0.97%
18. Rate of Increase,
7(a) (S) 9.71% -2.83%
19. Rate of Increase,
EOL ($) 64.4% 41.7%
20. % Private Sector-
Related Which
EOL (#) 5.89% 16.51% 17.47%
21. % Private Sector-
Related Which
EOL ($) 1.59% 5.04% 5.25%
22. Private Sector
Risk Exposure $111.7 mill. $121.9 mill. $106.2 mill.
23. Rate of Increase,
Private Sector
Risk Exposure 9.13% -12.89%
sector loan resources which went to minority borrowers rose from some-
thing less than $26.8 million in 1968 to $94.8 million in 1970.1s Of
this amount, $88.5 million (93.4%) in 1970 was in the form of guaran-
teed loans.
38. 1968 data do not report the amount of money loaned to minority borrowers by
private sector sources. It is obvious, however, that this amount is somewhat less than
$26.8 million, which is the total amount of money loaned to minority borrowers directly
and by private sector sources under SBA programs in 1968.
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The amount which private sector sources had at risk-that is, the
amount of private sector participation loans plus the unguaranteed
portion of partially guaranteed loans-was unavailable except for 1970.
On the average, private sector lenders in 1970 exposed themselves to a
risk of loss on only 10.6% of the money loaned to minority borrowers
under the EOL and 7(a) guarantee programs.
In general, the most dramatic changes in the SBA lending profile
were achieved in 1969. All of the minority indices available tapered
off considerably in 1970. The amount of money and the number of
loans increased by a relatively constant amount, and thus the rate of
growth declined significantly in 1970. The modest gain in average size
of minority loans was achieved largely in 1969.
Implications. Although Project OWN never reached its stated goals
of 10,000 new businesses in 1969 and 20,000 in 1970, it clearly accom-
plished a great deal in terms of greater loan flow to minority entre-
preneurs and greater bank involvement in minority lending. It seems
clear that the device of the government loan guarantee was an im-
portant incentive to private sector lenders. An overwhelming propor-
tion (93.4%) of private sector lending in 1970, for example, was
conducted with government guarantees; and only a small part of private
sector risk exposure was attributable to minority lending.
Since the size of a loan tends to relate to the type and scale of the
business, at least where the loan is for start-up expenses, the small size
of the average minority loan suggests that a great many of those loans
have gone to small, "Mom and Pop" retail or service enterprisesPO with
their characteristic unprofitability and small employment potential.40
89. Zucker JLC Interview. The inference that a small loan is being used to finance a
relatively small business depends on the fact of the loan being used for start-up expeass.
The SBA data do not report the use to which the loans are put, hence the inference is
tentative. That it is a sensible inference is supported by the general emphasis of Project
OWN on increasing the number of minority-owned businesses.
40. The best sources of information on failures and delinquencies are two recent
surveys by the American Bankers Association and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC). FDIC, Commercial Banks' Repayment Experience in Minority Lending,
June 1, 1970 (unpublished mimeo) [hereinafter cited as FDIC Study]; ABA Survey. The
FDIC surveyed 8 banks selected according to the same criterion employed here-because
they were believed to be "active" in minority lending. The ABA, on the other hand,
surveyed the nation's 300 largest banks.
The FDIC study reveals that retail and service businesses are indeed the most ris"y.
They account for 65% of the dollar volume of total loans made, and for 96% of the
delinquent dollar volume. Services prove to be the most risky businesses, amounting to 295o
of total loan volume and 707o of total delinquent loan volume. FDIC Study, at 4. A
similar but less dramatic pattern emerges with respect to chargeoffs. FDIC Study, at 5.
The study further finds that larger loans performed generally better than small loans:
As might be expected, the smaller loans had delinquency and chargeoff rates higher
than their share of total loans would indicate. At the other end of the scale, loans
of over $25,000 principal amount performed better than average, by about the same
percentages of delinquencies and chargeoffs as their share of the total would suggest.
627
The Yale Law Journal
The levelling off of many of Project OWN's accomplishments after
the first year has several possible explanations. One is that Adminis-
trator Samuels, whose zeal initiated and forcefully pushed banks into
Project OWN, served only until January 1969, and that his successor
has been less able to promote the program. This analysis is not com-
pletely persuasive, however, because the SBA is administered through
semi-autonomous regional offices, and by civil servants working under
both Administrators.
Another possible explanation is that banks in the early phase of
Project OWN may have participated more enthusiastically because of
guilt engendered by the riots of 1967. To the extent this analysis is
true, it suggests that the rationale under which a bank undertakes
minority lending, even when guaranteed, is something other than
standard profit maximization.
A third explanation is that fiscal 1970 coincided with a period of
economic recession, with rising unemployment and tight credit. In
such a time, banks are forced to allocate scarce loan resources more
carefully and must be certain to continue to provide banking services
to their best customers, thereby making credit generally less available
to new ventures and particularly to new ventures from which the
banks are unlikely to receive substantial deposits. A corollary to this
recession hypothesis, however, is that the demand for money to start
new businesses decreases when the economy slows down, since the
prospects of success in such times are less promising.
While one cannot be clear as to what extent each of these explana-
tions may be correct, all but the last, which explains the tapering off
of Project OWN's accomplishments in terms of diminished demand
for credit, indicate that the presence of a risk guarantee, while useful,
is not sufficient to make minority business loans fully competitive with
other lending opportunities.
FDIC Study, at 6.
The ABA survey, relating repayment information from 94 banks, found that 10.4%
of the total number and 17% of the dollar volume of minority business loans were de-
linquent. ABA Survey, at 9. The FDIC study averaged 12.6% and 5.7% respectively. With
respect to chargeoffs, in the ABA group gross chargeoffs were 4.1% of total value, while
in the FDIC group they were 2.8% of total volume. The ABA study reveals net chargeoffs
of 3.8% of total volume, and the FDIC survey shows 1.0%. ABA Survey at 9, FDIC Study,
at 7. It cannot, however, be fairly concluded that FDIC banks "did better" because they
had full-time staffs devoted to minority lending, because the ABA study Included
typically small installment loans, which were not included by the FDIC. As a result of
this incomparability, the differing loss and delinquency results of the FDIC and ABA
surveys are inconclusive. FDIC study, at 7. See also A. Brimmer and H. Terrell, The
Economic Potential of Black Capitalism (paper presented at 82nd Meeting of the Ameri-
can Economics Association, December 29, 1969).
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III. Field Survey of the Most Active Banks
A. Flow of Loans and Type of Businesses Borrowing--Banks Sur-
veyed.
Interviews conducted at the fourteen selected banks yielded quanti-
tative information of varying completeness. The most interesting ques-
tion as to the scale of bank lending which can be asked of the data from
these "active" banks is whether and to what extent banks are lending
to minority businesses in proportion to each bank's size. The data are





Began # M.L. (ions) ($000's) ($000s) standing % M.L./
Bank Prog. Loans $ Amount Av. Size Med. Size (Millions) M.L. Month
1 7/68 200 7.0
2 6/68 147 5.1
3 1/69 35 2.3
4 9/68 65 3.0
5 10/68 147 4.2
6 7166 250 4.1
7 5/68 81 1.0
8 4168 150 2.0
9 6/67 44 0.8
10 4/68 36 0.5
11 11/68 79 3.6
12 2/68 53 2.4
13 4/69 23 0A
14 4/68 80 2.5
35.0 NA 14,297.0 0.04 .0017
34.4 22.0 11,581.0 0.04 .0016
65.7 50.0 4,322.0 0.05 .0027
46.2 22.0 4,186.0 0.07 .0032
28.5 NA 3,464.0 0.12 .0057
16.4 11.0 1,570.0 0.26 .0054
12.7 NA 1,018.0 0.10 .0033
13.3 11.0 987.0 0.0 .0074
18.2 18.0 319.0 0.25 .0100
14.1 13.2 312.5 0.16 .0059
45.6 25.0 310.7 1.20 .0600
45.2 25.0 198.0 1.21 .04V0
15.7 NA 192.0 0.19 .0180
31.3 20.0 32.9 7.59 .300
% % % Loans Made % SBA
Chgeoffs % Long-t Re-lending thru Auxiliary Other















NA NA NA NA
28.8 10.0 0 10.0
50.0 85.7 0 NA
NA 60.0 0 25.0
15.0 85.0 1.4 NA
20.0 ---- 75 ---- NA*'
0 0 0 0
62.0 26.6 0 000
I1.0 NA NA NA
80.5 0 2.8 5.500
21.5 629.0 0 NA
NA NA NA NA
95.7 4.8 95.7 0
10.0 45.0 7.5 NA
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
% 4% Existing
% % % Wholesaling % But New to %
Bank Mfg. Service Retail & Other New Borrower Re.financlng
1 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 14.0 43.0 23.0 20.0 50.0 6.8 43.2
3 14.3 60.0 14.3 11.4 34.3 .... 65.7 - ..
4 7.7 16.9 30.8 44.6 43.1 23.1 33.8
5 NA NA NA NA 50.0 20.0 80.0
6 "few" ---- 95.0 ---- NA NA NA NA
7 1.2" ---- 98.8 ---- 0 NA NA NA
8 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
9 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
10 9.5 57.1 23.8 9.5 19.4 25.0 88.8
11 8.9 45.6 38.0 6.3 40.5 7.6 48.1
12 11.4 68.5 14.3 5.7 NA NA NA
13 4.3* 75.0 20.6 0 NA NA NA
14 4.0 41.0 38.0 17.0 37.0 13.0 50.0
1 loan.
Philadelphia banks also have access to a unique guarantee offered by the Job Loan
Corp., discussed at p. 638 infra.
Findings. The 14 banks sampled had individually made between
23 and 250 minority enterprise loans; in total dollar volume, the loan
totals per bank ranged from $0.4 million to $7.0 million.
above, relates not to the total of loans to minority group borrowers, but only to those
made in special programs, i.e. to those which allegedly would not otherwise have been
made. "Total Loans Outstanding" is the aggregate loan portfolio of the bank. This figure
was obtained as of June 30, 1970, where possible. Otherwise, the most recent figure avail.
able was used, which in most cases was total loans outstanding as of December 31, 1969.
The resultant error introduced is not substantial, as this number is used only to derive
the order of magnitude which minority loans represent in total lendin. The "total
minority loans" category relates the total loans committed from the beginning of the
program to date, hence the "% M.L." category does not describe the proportion of out.
standing minority loans to total outstanding loans. It is instead a rough index relating
the dollar value of minority loans to the size of the bank. The % M.L,/month Is defined
in text, p. 631 infra.
The category "% Loans Made Through Auxiliary Institutions" refers to loans which
have been developed by groups and agencies in the various cities. These "packagers"
are discussed in note 8 supra.
Although the quantitative questions were sent ahead to interviewees, many of the
numerical data gathered are only approximate. Their quality, candor, and accuracy vary
from bank to bank. Another serious problem is the sheer unavailability of comparable
data from all of the banks interviewed. This problem consistently arises with respect to
losses and the way they are recorded. In some banks, long.delinquent loans are simply
maintained on the books, thus artificially suppressing the loss rate. In others, loans which
are long overdue are "re-cycled"-a new loan is granted to retire the old notes. In still
others, losses are more promptly recorded or "charged-off." Because these procedures
vary and candor was most elusive with respect to delinquencies and losses, little weight
should be given to data in this area. One suspects that the great apparent variability dis-
covered in the loss experience of different banks is illusory. For the best available data on
delinquency and loss experience, see note 40 supra.
Another weakness is that the data vary in vintage. In some cases the administrative
structure of a bank's minority lending program has been operative for two or more years,
allowing at least tentative inferences to be drawn from the results. In others, programg
are too new for their success to have been reflected in performance data.
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The ratio of total minority loans committed since the beginning of
each bank's program to that bank's total loans outstanding (%M.L.)
varied from .04 to 7.59. In general, the larger the bank's total of loans
outstanding, the smaller its % M.L. This strong inverse relationship
persists even when the % M.L./month is calculated by dividing a bank's
% M.L. by the number of months elapsed between the program's
commencement and the date of the information to make a rough correc-
tion for the duration of each bank's program.
A surprising amount of the increased loan flow from the sampled
banks has not been guaranteed. Four banks had SBA guarantees on
fewer than 30% of their loans (by number). Of the seven other banks
for which this information was available, four had SBA guarantees on
50%-80% of their loans, and only three had guarantees on 80% or
more.
As to the types of businesses being financed, all banks but one made
more than half of their loans to retail and service businesses. No bank
made more than 50% of its loans to new enterprises, and all banks
reporting made at least one-third of their loans to businesses where no
change in ownership occurred.
Findings as to the delinquency and loss (chargeoff) experience of
banks' minority lending programs are unreliable. 2
Implications. In analyzing the sub-goal of an increase in the flow of
loans to minority businessmen, one is necessarily concerned with the
forces which explain and induce such an increase. The negative rela-
tionships between bank size and % M.L., and between bank size and
% M.L./month indicate at least tentatively that banks are involved
in minority lending in some relatively fixed amount and are not each
making loans in proportion to their sizes. The "fixed" amount is not a
rigid one-indeed, there is a considerable range in the number and
dollar volumes of minority loans among the institutions surveyed.
Most banks do not have particular loan pools limiting their minority
lending. What has happened, however, is that larger banks have not
committed staff personnel to minority lending in the same proportion
as the smaller banks.43 The human capabilities of a limited staff have
42. See note 41 supra.
43. Interview with Milton Davis, Urban Development Division, Hyde Park Banking &
Trust Company, in Chicago, July 9, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Davis, Hyde Park Inter-
view]; Interview with Joseph C. Angello, Bank of America in San Francisco, July 24, 1970
[hereinafter cited as Angello, B of A Interview]; Interview with Lawrence Toal, Com-
munity Economic Development Division, Chase Manhattan Bank, in New, York City,
July 28, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Toal, Chase Manhattan Interviel.
The size of full-time professional staffs devoted to minority lending ranged from one
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then operated as an effective ceiling on each bank's minority enterprise
involvement.
44
The surprisingly small proportion of loans made with government
guarantees may be attributed to the factors cited above45 which operate
to deter a bank from pursuing SBA guarantees or, on the other hand,
which inflate banks' claimed totals of high-risk loans. Alternatively,
banks with expert full-time staffs devoted to minority lending may be
able to make profitable loans to some high-risk borrowers without guar-
antees.
The types of businesses to which loans were made, as reported by the
banks, supports the inference drawn from the small size of SBA minor-
ity loans-that the increase in minority lending has tended to finance a
large number of small retail and service businesses, the classes of busi-
nesses most subject to failure. The finding that a substantial portion of
minority lending is to on-going enterprises where there is no change in
ownership is ambiguous. Formerly uncompetitive units may be borrow-
ing to expand and take advantage of economies of scale, or they may be
investing in modernized fixtures and equipment, more adequate inven-
tory, or improved marketing procedures. It is also possible, however,
that unprofitable businesses which were formerly sustained by intra-
family borrowing are now being carried along by banks.
B. Willingness to Forego Traditional Credit Criteria
Since high-risk minority borrowers characteristically lack substantial
personal or family resources and, to a varying degree, management ex-
to seven. In some cases, a unit performed additional lending functions, e.g. the bank with
seven full-time people used these people as its low-income housing loan staff as well.
The typical size of staff was between one and three full-time professional employcc--
only four banks had larger staffs. Although all of those four banks were among the
seven largest banks in the sample, the extra personnel commitment is not proportional to
size. The second largest bank, for example, has total loans nearly one hundred times
greater than the thirteenth largest bank, yet its staff commitment is four times greater,
The smallest bank has a larger staff commitment than the largest bank.
44. It is not implied that this inverse relationship, given the demand for credit and
the prevailing level of subsidy, could or should be completely eliminated. See note 15
supra. For Bank 1 to bring its % M.L./month up to parity with bank 14 would entail an
increase in its minority enterprise loans of more than $1 billion, four times the first year
national goal of Project OWN. Since there is no way of knowing how much credit Is
..enough," it is not clear that a credit infusion of this magnitude could be successfully
absorbed.
One cannot, then, attribute the inverse relationship between size and relative scale of
minority lending solely to tokenism on the part of banks. To an important extent, this
relationship merely describes the existence of the problem to which minority entrepreneur-
ship efforts address themselves-that non-whites are under-represented in the businems
class, and that the opportunities for minority group persons to begin businesses are
inadequate.
45. See p. 624 supra.
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perience as well, banks must relax traditional credit criteria-such as in-
sistence on collateral, a personal investment by the entrepreneur, large
compensating balances, and a high level of management expertise-if
they are to make a substantial volume of minority loans.
Because the banks had not formulated precise credit criteria to be
applied in their minority lending programs, the field interviews at-
tempted to explore the attitudes of bankers toward traditional credit
prerequisites.
While many of the lending officers felt that they had become more
cautious since the beginning of their minority lending programs-that
they had become increasingly concerned about avoiding failures-all
expressed some willingness to forego traditional ground rules. Ten
banks, for example, reported that they had on occasion loaned money
to minority borrowers in the absence of equity, although they empha-
sized that the loans were made only after an unsuccessful search for out-
side equity. Thirteen banks reported that they undertake efforts
to locate equity financing for borrowers when they are anxious to make
a loan but for this deficiency. In most cases, there is no institutional
equity source, and investment funds are obtained, if at all, from private
individuals. The SBA's waivable requirement is that equity financing
equal at least 15% of the total financing,40 and most banks accept this
as a reasonable guideline. This compares with the more traditional rule
of thumb that equity must amount to 50% or more of the total financ-
ing, and two banks felt that the SBA's 15% standard was too low.
Some bankers manifested a concern with the source of equity as well
as its quantity.47 Their insistence that equity financing be provided by
46. I Farr 180, 184.
47. The Nixon Administration has begun a program designed to produce a supply of
"outside" equity financing. The program is an adaptation of the Small Business Invest-
ment Company (SBIC) to the needs of financing minority-owned businesses. The new
vehide is simply an SBIC devoted to minority lending, with capital and overhead ex-
penses provided by a parent corporation. It is called a Minority Enterprise Small Business
Investment Company (MESBIC). Unique to this approach is its ability to leverage private
capital paid into the MESBIC. Capitalization at X enables the MESBIC to sell debentures
to the SBA in an amount equal to 2X. Total capital is then three times the original
capital. The minimum initial capitalization of $150,000, then, results in $0,000 for
equity investment. Office of Minority Business Enterprise, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Project Enterprise Information Kit (undated) [hereinafter cited as OMBE, Information
Kit].
Incentives for private capital to invest in MESBIC's are, however, sum. SBIC's and
their investors are allowed an ordinary-loss deduction rather than a capital.loss deduction
for investment losses and losses on sale of SBIC stock. Ir. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1243,
1242. SBIC's may also be allowed a 100% deduction for dividends received on investments
in domestic corporations. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 243(a)(2). There are no incentives for
MESBIC's above those available for regular SBIC's.
The response to the MESBIC program has been poor. Only nine MESBICs had been
chartered as of June 28, 1970-the target goal of 100 was to have been reached by
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the borrower himself, if applied rigorously, would preclude significant
expansion of lending to high-risk minority borrowers.
Bankers took a variety of positions on other credit criteria. Three
banks have begun to reverse their early policy of lending money to mi-
nority applicants on the basis of job skill alone, and have begun to in-
sist on management experience as well. Seven emphasized that they
now avoid small loans to retail trade and service businesses because in
their experience these were the most demanding and the most likely to
fail. Five banks insist on tightly structuring a loan, taking liens on
whichever of the borrower's assets they can in the interest of tying the
borrower to the success of his business. Only one of these five disap-
proved of taking liens on personal property.
In general, the bankers believed that the "proper" policy is not sim-
ply to waive credit prerequisites, but to plan as carefully as possible to
maximize the chances of success for those businesses that are to receive
credit.
C. The Availability of Liberal Repayment Terms
From the perspective of the high-risk borrower whose business may
be financed almost entirely through debt, liberal loan repayment terms
are essential if he is to manage his business while meeting his repayment
obligations. Typically, the borrower desires such repayment features
as an interest-only grace period at the outset, a manageable interest
rate, and a long maturity.
Banks were generally willing to provide liberal repayment terms to
accomodate the businessman's cash-flow capabilities. All claimed that
minority borrowers get more flexible repayment terms than regular
small business customers. In particular, eleven specified that interest-
only grace periods were common, although only four reported that
such periods lasted for one year or more on most loans.48 Eight of the
banks reported that the average maturity of their loans is 5-7 years,
June 30. As Under Secretary of Commerce Siciliano said on June 28, "It's hard to imbue
businessmen with social consciousness when business is bad," N.Y. Times, June 29, 1970,
at 1, col. 6. The MESBIC program was given a substantial boost on December 1, 1970,
when the Ford Foundation announced grants and loans totalling $2.5 million to six
MESBICs involving black, Puerto Rican and Indian communities. Ford Foundation Press
Release, December 1, 1970. Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans admitted the program's
lack of success when he commented that the Foundation's contribution gave MESBIC "a
dignity and status that has been difficult to achieve," and that the Ford support had
provided "more stimulus than MESBIC has had since it was established." N.Y. Times,
December 2, 1970, at 71, col. 1.
48. Yet the EOL guarantee program allows such periods for up to 18 months, 18
C.F.R. § 119.31(b) (1970).
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and only two adhered to the more traditional 3-5 year limit for small
business loans.
Interest rates charged to minority borrowers under the special pro-
grams varied substantially, from 7.5% to 12% simple interest, with six
banks making most of their minority loans at 1.5 points above the
prime bank rate. Two banks charged the same rates as for regular small
business borrowers, and another two consciously charged more, in
recognition of the increased risk and cost of making minority loans.
In the case of high-risk minority borrowers, then, relatively low rates
are being extended despite high risk, small compensating balances,
and relatively large administrative costs. Although only one of the
banks interviewed claimed to have tested empirically the net cost of
its minority lending program, all report that these programs are, on
balance, costly.49 As noted, from the banks' perspective, the loans are
"soft."
D. Institutionalization of Minority Lending: Administrative Arrange-
ments.
Broadly speaking, institutional arrangements employed by banks
for the operation of minority lending programs are of two types, those
conducted by banks themselves ("in-house"), and those conducted by
separate agencies sponsored by banks ("external"). Both types have
variants, each with peculiar advantages and disadvantages.
1. In-House Programs
Findings. Thirteen of the banks studied had in-house programs. The
primary issue faced by a bank setting up an in-house program is whether
the program should be centralized or decentralized, although only
banks in states which allow branch banking are seriously confronted
with this choice. Banks in Chicago and Denver, for example, are con-
fined by state law to one banking location only ("unit banking"). In
New York, Pennsylvania, Georgia,r0 and California, banks are permit-
ted one form or other of branch banking. Only three of the eight banks
49. Interview with E. Bowman McLean, Colorado National Bank, in Denver, July 21,
1970 [hereinafter cited as McLean, Colorado National Interview]. Mr. McLean estimates
that it costs his bank $1,000 net of income generated to make and service a $20.000
minority enterprise loan. Most other banks interviewed showed surprisingly little Interest
in knowing the net cost of their programs. This suggests that minority lending efforts are
not thought of as being regular bank business. See pp. 641-42 infra.
50. Branch banking was allowed in Georgia at the time the Citizens & Southern Na-
tional Bank was expanding. Interview with William W. Malone, Citizens and Southern
National Bank, in Atlanta, July 14, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Malone, C & S Interview].
635
The Yale Law Journal
which had a branch banking system chose to maintain a central site
for their minority lending programs.
Implications. The bankers interviewed felt that the relative merits
of the centralized and the branch banking programs should be analyzed
in terms of outreach to minority borrowers, stigma attached to bor-
rowers, and incentives to lending officers to make high-risk loans.
The great disadvantage of a centralized system, unless conducted in a
neighborhood readily accessible to potential borrowers, is greater diffi-
culty in attracting customers. To cope with this problem, a bank must
place more emphasis on outside referral sources. Another disadvantage
perceived by the bankers is that banks which have branches but conduct
minority lending at only one office open themselves to charges of token-
ism and racism in that a high-risk minority borrower must go to a
particular place and is unwelcome at other branches.
On the other hand, centralized programs have one fundamental ad-
vantage-the lending officers who process the applications are typically
part of a special minority enterprise unit which is not expected to
generate profit. The officers quickly develop at least some expertise in
the problems of minority borrowers and are thus likely to be both
more sympathetic and more effective than ordinary lending officers.
The programs which utilize branch banks are likely to have fewer
problems with outreach and stigmatization. Their great disadvantage
is lack of control over the conduct of lending officers. A strong disin-
centive exists for the typical lending officer to become involved with a
minority borrower. Even if a bank's management has announced a
commitment to minority lending, the lending officer is faced with the
reality of periodic evaluations for salary increases and promotions.
Minority enterprise loans tend to be more time-consuming than others
(estimates vary from twice to ten times as much time required), they
are smaller, and they generate relatively insubstantial deposits. Fur-
thermore, such loans are more likely to be delinquent, thereby requir-
ing even more time, and they are more likely to fail. For a credit officer
who is evaluated on the basis of how much income is generated by his
total time expenditure, the incentive to avoid minority enterprise
lending activity is plain.5'
Three banks have identified and made attempts to cope with these
disincentives. The Chase Manhattan Bank has established a Com-
munity Economic Development (CED) division, which oversees the
51. Interview with John E. Williams III, First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., In
Philadelphia, July 6, 1970.
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minority lending efforts of branch officers and acts as an internal risk
guarantor. The CED lends no money itself, but participates in the
processing of minority enterprise loans. Most notably, the program has
implemented a first step toward reducing the disincentive to lending
officers by coding minority enterprise loans into the computer by
branch and lending officer and also by CED code number. The
branch and lending officer get credit for all income generated, but the
GED is charged if the loan is defaulted.52 A second bank, Wells Fargo
in California, has implemented the same type of internal risk guaran-
tee. 3
At neither of these banks, however, is the disincentive completely
met. The sheer time-ineffectiveness of minority lending remains, not-
withstanding removal of risk. A third bank, the Bank of America in
California, has attempted to meet this problem by allowing 20%
"extra" or unaccounted-for time to its low income neighborhood
branches.-4 Alternatively, the disincentive could be counteracted by
adding some "shadow" amount onto the profits actually generated by
the particular officer.
The principal general advantage of an in-house arrangement is its
relative normalcy-borrowers are not stigmatized (or at least may not
be), and bankers have the opportunity to deal directly with a type of
borrower new to their experience. Ultimately, such contact may help
to reduce racial discrimination in the credit market. A concomitant
disadvantage, however, is that bank public relations departments may
descend on a program, introducing new and dysfunctional administra-
tive concerns.155
2. Externalized Programs
Findings. In four of the cities in which interviews were conducted,
banks had established, either independently or in concert, external
vehicles, each on a different model.
(a) The Single Bank External Lender. The Citizens & Southern
Bank merely created a separate organization, called the Citizens &
Southern Development Corporation, to engage in minority lending.
The parent bank provided $2 million from its loan loss reserves for hous-
52. Toal, Chase Manhattan Interview.
53. Interview with Thomas AV. Stoddard, Wells Fargo Bank-, in San Francisco, July 24,
1970.
54. Angello, B of A Interview.
55. Toal, Chase Manhattan Interview.
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ing loans and loans to minority entrepreneurs 6 and pays the new
vehicle's annual operating expenses.
(b) Multi-Bank Risk Sharing. Philadelphia's Job Loan Corporation
(JLC) is a consortium of eight banks which agreed to lend money to mi-
nority entrepreneurs through JLC until total chargeoffs reached $2 mil-
lion. Anticipated chargeoffs were 25% of dollar volume, making the
total projected loan availability $8 million. JLC does not make loans
directly, but instead authorizes its guarantee of loans which are actually
made by member banks. When a loan authorized by JLG and made by
one of the member banks fails, JLC sells notes to the member banks.
Each bank buys a note bearing the same proportion to the total loss as
that bank's size bears to the aggregate size of the member banks; the
losing bank is then repaid 7 JLG's staff also does rudimentary "packag-
ing," but is not substantially involved in post-loan assistance.59
(c) Multi-Bank Risk Sharing and Lending. A group of San Fran-
cisco banks in February 1969 initiated an organization named Oppor-
tunity Through Ownership (OPTO), incorporated under the California
Job Development Corporation Law. 0 The consortium of banks lends
OPTO money and shares its losses, allocating them to member banks
proportionately to their sizes. 60 Distinguishing characteristics of OPTO
are that it loans money directly to borrowers and that it seeks out large-
scale minority business ventures which promise considerable growth
and which are unbankable mostly because they are short of equity
financing. Because it is chartered as a Job Development Corporation
under California law, 1 OPTO is qualified to receive state loan guaran-
tees, which are flexible but scarce.02 Thus far, $200,000 of the $1.7 mil-
lion committed by OPTO has been so guaranteed.
0 3
(d) Multi-Bank External Processor. The Colorado Economic Devel.
opment Association (CEDA) is a pure packaging agency funded by
participating banks, the SBA, and a local foundation. It conducts
courses and seminars on business topics for minority borrowers, pre.
pares loan applications and accompanying documents, and conducts a
6-month follow-up program to provide rudimentary post-loan assis.
56. Malone, C & S Interview.
57. Zucker, JLC Interview.
58. Interview with Ronald Pappas, Girard Bank, in Philadelphia, July 8, 1970; Zuckcr,
JLC Interview.
59. Job Development Corporation Law, Cal. Corp. Code § 14,000 ot seq. (Wcst),
60. Id. § 14078.
61. See note 59 supra.
62. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 14040-14046 (West).
63. Interview with Melvin C. Yocum, Opportunity Through Ownership, In San Fran.
cisco, July 23, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Yocum, OPTO Interview].
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tance.4 Completed loan applications are sent to one of the four
participating banks, where some 80% are approved.o
Implications. Freedom from control and public relations manipula-
tion, greater professionalism, and economies of scale are potential
advantages of external organizations. An external agency may be better
able to maintain credibility in minority communities than is a large
bank, and may as a result have superior outreach, a community
planning aspect and greater ability to select promising entrepreneurs
from among loan applicants.
Depending on the nature of the relationship between sponsor banks
and the resultant external programs, however, externalization may
permit a bank to flee the problems of minority entrepreneurship rela-
tively cheaply, thus contributing little to the institutionalization of
minority lending. This general problem of an external vehicle enabling
a bank to avoid the challenge of financing minority enterprises is ex-
acerbated when that vehicle lends money directly, because direct con-
tact of the banks with minority borrowers is reduced.00
Additional incentives to such behavior come in the form of mutual
risk guarantees, which also serve to make lending through the external
organization relatively more attractive than the development of in-
house lending capabilities to match the need of high-risk minority
borrowers.
67
The external processor model has the potential for realizing important
economies while aiding the institutionalization of minority lending. If
the external processor performs those processes which banks are not well-
equipped to execute,"8 such as packaging and post-loan assistance, it
can spread the cost of developing such a capability among member
banks, and perhaps realize scale economies as well. Important to the
64. Lucero, CEDA Interview; Colorado Economic Development Association, Annual
Report, August 1970 (unpublished mimeo).
65. Lucero, CEDA Interview.
66. Only two of the San Francisco clearinghouse banks have undertaken independent
minority enterprise lending programs. Yocum, OPTO Interview.
67. Only three of the eight banks which formed the Job Loan Corporation in Phila-
delphia have independent minority enterprise lending programs. Zucker, JLC Interview.
68. Every banker who did not avoid the question agreed to some extent with the prop-
osition that the main reason, apart from racism, why minority group businessinen have
not received much credit is that bankers have never been in the business of making very
sophisticated judgments among various credit risks, but have instead lent money under
heavily protected circumstances, typically resting on solid collateral and large deposits.
By offering none of these protections, the potential black entrepreneur's loan appltion
forces the banker to analyze risk with greater care. And this is a task for which many
lending ofcers have not been adequately prepared. A Joriori, bankers are no., largelyunable to perform expert packaging and post-loan assistance, and it is unlikely that theywill develop this capability for 
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institutionalization of minority lending, however, is the continued in.
volvement of bank personnel in the lending process. CEDA has main-
tained such involvement by insisting that bank personnel participate
in the final stages of packaging, and in post-loan review and assistance
for the first 6 months after the loan.6 9
IV. Conclusiois
Subject to the qualifications expressed throughout the Note7 0 avail-
able evidence suggests that the flow of loans from commercial banks to
high-risk minority entrepreneurs has substantially increased as a result
of government incentives, government prodding, a declared industry-
wide policy, and various "soft" incentives generated within major
banks. The rate of increase, however, was greatest during fiscal 1969,
and levelled off in important respects during fiscal 1970. The SBA's
goal of 10,000 businesses in fiscal 1969 and 20,000 in fiscal 1970 was not
reached. The ABA's goal of $1 billion in minority loans by 1975 would
require an average of $142.9 million per year, and this has not been
reached either.
The evidence gathered suggests that a large proportion of minority
loans have been made to businesses of relatively small size, engaged
in retail and service fields. These businesses have the highest chance of
failure and represent relatively small income and employment potential
for the entrepreneurs and for minority communities in general.71
The field survey shows that in the most "active" banks, loans are
being made to borrowers with little management and skill experience,
no collateral, and little or no personal savings to invest. Some bankers
find that financing businesses which have no equity base is simply too
risky, and are reacting to high early failure rates by tightening credit
prerequisites somewhat.
Although the continued unprofitability of minority lending and
the relatively liberal credit terms available for minority borrowers at
"active" banks suggest that minority lending by these banks consists
primarily of "soft" loans, this "softness" is, in turn, a principal obstacle
to the institutionalization of minority lending. For while liberal loan
terms are essential for borrowers who lack equity financing, the un-
profitability of high-risk minority lending undermines the prospect of
such lending being conducted by banks as a matter of course.
69. Lucero, CEDA Intervim.
70. See notes 14, 17, 28, 87, 41, and pp. 620-21 supra.
71. See note 40 supra.
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It is dear that some banks which do not have independent programs
are making SBA-guaranteed loans. It may be that these loans are un-
profitable, and are made in response to government prodding. But it
may also be that the loans are profitable, either because these banks
have loaned money to borrowers in a risk range where the SBA guaran-
tees have effectively "hardened" the loans, or because the banks are
"creaming" by obtaining SBA guarantees on loans which are not
genuinely high-risk.
72
The field survey banks, all of which had established independent
high-risk minority lending programs, used relatively few guarantees,
and their programs were in most cases unprofitable. This unprofitability
is underscored by the fact that only eighty-nine of the nation's three
hundred largest commercial banks had established such programs
7 3
Why, then, have special minority lending programs been undertaken?
Three reasons were given by the bankers interviewed. By far the most
common is "corporate goodwill," or "business obligation" or a similar
variant on the theme of public relations. Theodore Gross suggests this
motive is rather less "soft" or altruistic than it might appear-by un-
dertaking voluntary compliance, banks help to guard against a possible
statutory mandate to make a fixed portion of their loans in ghetto
areas.74
A second reason is that some banks hope that their minority enter-
prise loan programs will attract young job applicants concerned with
social involvement.
A third reason frequently given by bankers is that minority enter-
prise programs are in some vague way consistent with long-run profit
maximization. Urban banks are faced with home markets increasingly
populated by non-whites. Bankers reason that by making an effort to
foster minority businesses, they help to create new customers and learn
to deal with the market on which they increasingly depend. Given the
national and international scope of dealings by major banks, however,
this rationale is tenuous.
A fourth reason, given by Cross but by none of the bankers inter-
viewed, is the persuasion of the federal government. 1 An excellent
example is Howard Samuels' extensive travel and exhortations in behalf
of Project OWN. The fact that this kind of persuasion, plus the spectre
of urban rioting, was necessary to induce banks to expand minority
72. See note 37 supra.
73. ABA Survey, at 9.
74. T. CRoss, BLAcm CATPrrAmsm 128 (1969).
75. Id. 124-26.
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lending only serves to underscore the observation that high-risk minor-
ity lending programs are not currently predicated on quantifiable profit
maximization3 6
This is not to disparage the far-sightedness of certain banks' man-
agement, as shown by their commitment of resources to minority lend-
ing. It is, rather, to observe that bankers like other businessmen are
concerned with profits. Incentives which do not affect the objective
cost-benefit calculus are inherently uncertain.
As for the other aspects of institutionalization, those relating to the
administration of minority lending programs, no clear pattern emerges.
The problems of outreach to potential borrowers, stigma, and lending
officer incentives have not been solved in most banks. Some banks have
successfully avoided one or more of these difficulties, but no single bank
program stands out as a complete success.
Several policy recommendations to improve bank performance with
respect to financing free-standing minority-owned businesses are sug-
gested by the analysis above. Some progress has been made in providing
debt financing to high-risk minority borrowers. Yet consistent progress
toward the five sub-goals of minority lending cannot be expected
until such lending is made profitable.
The SBA loan guarantee programs should be changed in certain
respects. The guarantee ceilings on all SBA loans should be increased
to 100%. Risk is only one aspect of the disincentive to minority lend-
ing, but there seems no reason why it should remain. The current dis-
parity between guarantees available in the EOL and 7(a) programs
merely serves as an incentive to small loans, which is precisely the
wrong way for incentives to point."
Some banks are now deterred from seeking SBA guarantees when
the appropriate loan form is a line of credit to meet seasonal and
inventory needs, since the SBA will guarantee only loans with fixed
amortization schedules.1 8 SBA guarantees should be expanded to in-
clude such lines of credit.
76. Further supporting evidence is found in the history of the sample banks' Involve.
ment. Only one bank in the sample had undertaken a special program before the 1907
riots. Eleven began their programs after the assassination of Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr., and only five of those began after the initiation of Project OWN. A tentative
suggestion from this pattern is that the motivation informing a bank's decision to start
a special program to lend money to high-risk borrowers is less a response to the reduced
risk offered by Project OWN than to other factors.
77. See note 40 supra. The 90% maximum guarantee on 7(a) loans is not mandated
by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 636 (Supp. V, 1970). It has been an administrative feature of
the program, however, since 1954. See 19 Fed. Reg. 5541 (1954) at. 101.4((2). Howard
Samuels, without explanation, simply reiterated this policy. 33 Fe. Reg. 1 76 (1968).
The 90% maximum appears at 13 C.F.R. § 120.2(b)(2) (1970).
78. Toal, Chase Manhattan Interview.
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More expeditious SBA approval procedures would reduce the cost
to banks of obtaining loan guarantees. The Chicago SBA office has
recently introduced an automatic blanket guarantee plan which allows
for an automatic guarantee if a loan is not rejected by the SBA within
three days of receipt of the application.-- A slightly better system
which might be implemented nationally would be similar to that now
used for Federal Housing Administration mortgage guarantees. A
bank under this system would be authorized to commit the govern-
ment guarantee on its own discretion, and would be subject only to a
post-loan audit.
Further incentives, however, will be necessary if banks are to over-
come the inordinate unprofitability of minority lending. Such incen-
tives could take a number of obvious theoretical forms. 0 Apart from
SBA and California loan guarantees, however, only one incentive
model was discovered in operation during the field research. This was
found at the Hyde Park Bank & Trust Company in Chicago, the only
bank interviewed which operates its minority enterprise program at
a profit.". This model, based on a variation of the State of Illinois'
linked deposit program, 2 is designed to use the earnings on state
deposits to pay for the administrative expenses of a full-time
minority lending staff. The State Treasurer provided time deposits of
$2.5 million and demand deposits of $1.0 million as part of this ex-
periment8 3
When the interview was conducted, the Hyde Park bank still had
$2.5 million in state deposits. It had expanded on the program, how-
ever, by soliciting corporate deposits of $3 million made specifically
79. Interview with Russel IL Ewert, First National Bank of Chicago, in Chicago, July
9, 1970.
80. Possible incentive models might be: repeal of the usury laws, thereby allowing
banks to charge minority borrowers interest rates commensurate with risk and admin-
istrative costs, with direct grants being made to borrowers to make debt service costs
tolerable; banks could be subsidized directly, according to the amount loaned to minority
borrowers; or banks could be given tax incentives to undertake minority lending. Any
comparative evaluation of these incentive models would be highly speculative, as none
has been implemented. Such evaluation is beyond the scope of this Note.
81. Davis, Hyde Park Interviev.
82. State Treasurer Adlai E. Stevenson II initiated the linked deposit program -hortly
after taking office in 1967. The program's objectives were to allocate public funds so as to
maximize earnings and reduce the need for tax revenues, to equalize regional distribution
of state funds, and to use public funds to permit and stimulate private investment to
serve public needs. The program was implemented starting February 1, 1963, and allo-
cated $240 million in idle state funds under a Basic and Supplemental Deposit program.
Thirty-five per cent of those funds went for Supplemental Deposits, directed to banks on
the basis of their lending in specified areas, including "Community Service." The Hyde
Park experiment was an adjunct to this linked deposit effort S)stemetrics, The Impact
of linked Deposit Programs For Allocating Public Funds II-B-7-II-B-19 (unpublished
manuscript prepared for the Ford Foundation, 1963).
83. Id. at I1-B-19.
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in support of the bank's minority enterprise program. These deposits
do not constitute a loan pool for minority enterprises. Instead the
bank allocates a portion of the earnings on the Urban Development
Division Sponsors' accounts to pay the expenses of that division. The
Division director reports that this combination of private and state
deposits, linked to a specified form of activity, has enabled the Division
to function at a profit.3 4
Of course the incentives constructed in the Hyde Park model are
not uniformly hard. Corporate accounts garnered receive competitive
interest returns but doubtless cost the corporations somewhat more to
administer when located at an extra bank with which they do not nor-
mally do business. Yet the extent to which this bank program rests
on non-pecuniary incentives is negligible compared to all other bank
programs.
The Hyde Park model represents an important demonstration of the
potential efficacy of the linked deposit concept as an incentive to bank
lending to minority entrepreneurs. Hyde Park's minority loans equal
7.5% of its outstanding total loans, which is by far the largest propor-
tion of minority loans found at any of the banks interviewed.
The linked deposit concept might be adopted by state and federal
governments as one way of compensating private lenders for lending
money for specified, socially "important" uses. It is difficult to estimate
the consequences in terms of minority enterprise and other public ef-
forts of channeling public funds (and perhaps corporate funds, which
might be a demand of "public interest" shareholder groups) in this way.
But the orders of magnitude of deposited public funds are large. In
fiscal 1967, for example, $24 billion was held by state governments in
cash and securities, apart from the funds held under provisions of
various state insurance and pension trust systems8 5 These essentially
idle funds are normally allocated in the discretion of state treasurers.8 0
The analysis above has been predicated on an existing state of affairs
as to other stages of the business creation process. But recommenda-
84. Davis, Hyde Park Interview.
85. Systemetrics, note 82 supra, at If-1. No similar compilation is readily available for
all federal government funds, as bank deposits are reported on an agency basis. Presum-
ably, however, the amounts are quite large.
86. Id. at 11-4. In some states, however, treasurers are prohibited from investing Idle
cash balances in either time deposits or securities.
Even larger amounts are held by states under various trust fund and insurance fund
arrangements. In fiscal 1967, this totalled $40 billion for all states. Typically, there are
more restrictions on allocation of these funds, but the Systemetrics report concludes that
"state trust-system funds represent a very significant potential source of long-term funds
to finance federally-assisted public facilities and housing programs." Id. at 11-5.
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dons of programs to improve the minority lending performance of
commercial banks need not be limited to the debt financing stage
alone.
"Packaging" services are available in some cities from organizations
established by the federal government, corporations, foundations, and,
in some instances, banks.87 The existing packagers are, however, to few
and typically understaffed. The size and number of these agencies
should be expanded.
Post-loan assistance is not currently available in most cities, yet, in
the opinion of every banker interviewed, is important if businesses
financed under minority lending programs are to succeed. The only
important model for the provision of post-loan assistance is the Arcata
Management Company in Menlo Park, California, funded by an SBA
technical assistance grant in March 1970.8 The Arcata model is designed
to provide free management and technical assistance for the forty-six
customers of the Arcata Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment
Company 9 and for eleven other minority-owned enterprises. Assistance
is provided by the Management Company's full-time staff and by pro-
fessional consultants whose services are hired as needed. Some of these
consultants volunteer their services. 0
Such capabilities should be incorporated into packaging agencies.
Minority borrowers could thus get pre- and post-loan supportive ser-
vices from the same source. Packagers could charge some monthly fee
to borrowers using the service, though the high cost of such services
would probably necessitate government funding as well.9 ' Under this
arrangement, packagers would employ full-time management consul-
tants and might retain, perhaps at a reduced rate, lawyers, accountants
and bookkeepers whose services would be available to borrowers as
needed.9
2
Equity financing is another stage of the process of minority business
formation where outside aid is largely unavailable. 3 A public program
87. See note 8 supra.




91. The Arcata Management Company's 1-year grant, for example, is for $143,750.
92. Interview with Benjamin Goldstein, National Council for Equal Business Oppor-
tunity, in Washington, D.C. July 1, 1970. The concept of a management company is also
supported by Lawrence Toal, Chase Manhattan Bank.
93. Apart from the few MESBICs, some packaging agencies have small amounts of
equity financing, e.g. the Rochester Business Opportunities Corporation and Coalition
Venture Corporation in New York City. The Chicago Economic Development Corporation
is one of the recipients of a Ford Foundation investment to start a MESBIC.
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might be created to tap the existing large pools of investment funds
now managed by banks as trustees.94 Such a policy would have to in-
volve complete risk guarantees as well as incentives in the form of a
guaranteed level of earnings on the entrusted accounts. 95
If expanding minority entrepreneurship is to remain an aspect of
national policy aimed at bringing about racial equality, and if the
encouragement of free-standing minority-owned businesses is to con-
tinue as part of that policy, changes of the sort recommended above will
have to be implemented. The common theme which runs through the
recommendations is a greater commitment of economic resources. With
the conspicuous exception of loan guarantees under Project OWN,
federal efforts have tended to rely on exhortations. Private efforts, as a
consequence, have tended to be motivated by good will and public rela-
tions. It is doubtful whether any public policy can be sustained by
such slender reeds.
94. A clear obstacle to such uses of trust accounts is the doctrine of fiduciary responsi-
bility. The standard of care for trustees is that trust investments must be such as a
reasonably prudent man would make of his own property under the circumstances,
having primarily in mind the safety and productivity of the investment. Harvard College
v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). See also R.XsrATezMENT (SEcO ND) ov Ttusis
§ 227(a).
95. A complete risk guarantee would presumably meet the requirement of safety. Un-
secured loans in many states have been deemed improper uses of trust funds, but
unsecured time deposits in banks are no longer imprudent because they are Insured
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. III Scorr oN TRs-rs § 227.8 (3d ed. 1967).
The productivity requirement would have to be met by a guaranteed level of earningi,
perhaps equal to the average earnings of the trust account. The conservatism of trustees
would likely remain an obstacle, and an added yield guarantee would have to be included.
Without experimentation, it must remain unclear how large that incentive would have
to be, and how much such a program would cost.
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